

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.

L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
Emily A. Horne (State Bar No. 347723)
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
ehorne@bursor.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

VISHAL SHAH and JAYDEN KIM, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FANDOM, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:24-cv-01062-RFL

**FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION
COMPLAINT**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1 Plaintiffs Vishal Shah and Jayden Kim (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others
2 similarly situated, by and through their attorneys, make the following allegations pursuant to the
3 investigation of their counsel and based upon information and belief, except as to allegations
4 specifically pertaining to themselves and their counsel, which are based on personal knowledge.

5 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

6 1. Defendant Fandom, Inc. (“Defendant”) owns and operates a website, Gamespot.com
7 (the “Website” or “Gamespot”).

8 2. When users visit the Website, Defendant causes three trackers—the GumGum
9 Tracker, Audiencerate Tracker, and TripleLift Tracker (the “Trackers”)—to be installed on Website
10 visitors’ internet browsers. Defendant then uses these Trackers to collect Website visitors’ IP
11 addresses.

12 3. Because the Trackers capture Website visitors’ “routing, addressing, or signaling
13 information,” the Trackers each constitute a “pen register” under Section 638.50(b) of the California
14 Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”). Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b); *see also Greenley v. Kochava, Inc.*,
15 2023 WL 4833466 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2023).

16 4. By installing and using the Trackers without Plaintiffs’ prior consent and without a
17 court order, Defendant violated CIPA section 638.51(a).

18 5. Plaintiffs bring this action to prevent Defendant from further violating the privacy
19 rights of California residents, and to recover statutory damages for Defendant’s violation of CIPA
20 section 638.51.

21 **PARTIES**

22 6. Plaintiff Shah resides in Orange County, California and has an intent to remain there,
23 and is therefore a citizen of California. Plaintiff Shah was in California when he visited the Website.

24 7. Plaintiff Kim resides in San Jose, California and has an intent to remain there, and is
25 therefore a citizen of California. Plaintiff Kim was in California when he visited the Website.

26 8. Defendant Fandom, Inc. is a Delaware corporation, with its principal place of business
27 located in California.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1
2 9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
3 1332(d)(2)(a) because this case is a class action where the aggregate claims of all members of the
4 proposed class are in excess of \$5,000,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs, there are over 100
5 members of the putative class, and at least one class member is a citizen of a different state than
6 Defendant.

7 10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it is headquartered in
8 California.

9 11. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because Defendant resides in this
10 District.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

11
12 **I. THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**

13 12. The California Legislature enacted CIPA to protect certain privacy rights of
14 California citizens. The California Legislature expressly recognized that “the development of new
15 devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications ... has
16 created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and
17 civilized society.” Cal. Penal Code § 630.

18 13. As relevant here, CIPA section 638.51(a) proscribes any “person” from “install[ing]
19 or us[ing] a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order.”

20 14. A “pen register” is a “a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing,
21 addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
22 electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code
23 § 638.50(b).

24 15. A “trap and trace device” is a “a device or process that captures the incoming
25 electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing,
26 or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
27 communication, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b).
28

1 16. In plain English, a “pen register” is a “device or process” that records *outgoing*
2 information, while a “trap and trace device” is a “device or process” that records *incoming*
3 information.

4 17. Historically, law enforcement used “pen registers” to record the numbers of outgoing
5 calls from a particular telephone line, while law enforcement used “trap and trace devices” to record
6 the numbers of incoming calls to that particular telephone line. As technology advanced, however,
7 courts have expanded the application of these surveillance devices.

8 18. For example, if a user sends an email, a “pen register” might record the email address
9 it was sent from, the email address the email was sent to, and the subject line—because this is the
10 user’s *outgoing* information. On the other hand, if that same user receives an email, a “trap and trace
11 device” might record the email address it was sent from, the email address it was sent to, and the
12 subject line—because this is *incoming* information that is being sent to that same user.

13 19. Although CIPA was enacted before the dawn of the Internet, “the California Supreme
14 Court regularly reads statutes to apply to new technologies where such a reading would not conflict
15 with the statutory scheme.” *In re Google Inc.*, 2013 WL 5423918, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013);
16 *see also Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15 (referencing CIPA’s “expansive language” when
17 finding software was a “pen register”); *Javier v. Assurance IQ, LLC*, 2022 WL 1744107, at *1 (9th
18 Cir. May 31, 2022) (“Though written in terms of wiretapping, [CIPA] Section 631(a) applies to
19 Internet communications.”). This accords with the fact that, “when faced with two possible
20 interpretations of CIPA, the California Supreme Court has construed CIPA in accordance with the
21 interpretation that provides the greatest privacy protection.” *Matera v. Google Inc.*, 2016 WL
22 8200619, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016).

23 20. Individuals may bring an action against the violator of any provision of CIPA—
24 including CIPA section 638.51—for \$5,000 per violation. Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a)(1).


25 **II. DEFENDANT VIOLATES THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**

26 **A. The Trackers Are “Pen Registers”**

27 21. To make Defendant’s Website load on a user’s internet browser, the browser sends
28 an “HTTP request” or “GET” request to Defendant’s server where the relevant Website data is stored.

1 In response to the request, Defendant’s server sends an “HTTP response” back to the browser with
 2 a set of instructions. A general diagram of this process is pictured at Figure 1, which explains how
 3 Defendant’s Website transmits instructions back to users’ browsers in response to HTTP requests.
 4 See Figure 1.

5 **Figure 1:**



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12 22. The server’s instructions include how to properly display the Website—*e.g.*, what
13 images to load, what text should appear, or what music should play.

14 23. In addition, the server’s instructions cause the Trackers to be installed on a user’s
15 browser. The Trackers then cause the browser to send identifying information—including the
16 user’s IP address—to GumGum, Audiencerate, and TripleLift.

17 24. The IP address is a unique identifier for a device, which is expressed as four sets of
18 numbers separated by periods (*e.g.*, 192.168.123.132). The first two sets of numbers indicate what
19 network the device is on (*e.g.*, 192.168), and the second two sets of numbers identify the specific
20 device (*e.g.*, 123.132).

21 25. Thus, the IP address enables a device to communicate with another device—such as
22 a computer’s browser communicating with a server—and the IP address contains geographical
23 location.

24 26. Through an IP address, the specific device’s state, city, and zip code can be
25 determined.

26 27. Much like a telephone number, an IP address is a unique numerical code associated
27 with a specific internet-connected device. Thus, knowing a user’s IP address—and therefore
28

1 geographical location—”provide[s] a level of specificity previously unfound in marketing.”¹

2 28. An IP address allows advertisers to (i) “[t]arget [customers by] countries, cities,
3 neighborhoods, and ... postal code”² and (ii) “to target specific households, businesses[,] and even
4 individuals with ads that are relevant to their interests.”³ Indeed, “IP targeting is one of the most
5 targeted marketing techniques [companies] can employ to spread the word about [a] product or
6 service”⁴ because “[c]ompanies can use an IP address ... to personally identify individuals.”⁵

7 29. For example, businesses who are trying to reach college-aged demographics can
8 target devices on college campuses by sending advertisements to IP addresses associated with
9 college-wide Wi-Fis.⁶ Or, for a job fair in specific city, companies can send advertisements to only
10 those in the general location of the upcoming event.⁷

11 30. In addition to “reach[ing] their target audience with greater precision,” businesses are
12 incentivized to use a customer’s IP address because it “can be more cost-effective than other forms
13 of advertising.”⁸ “By targeting specific households or businesses, businesses can avoid wasting
14 money on ads that are unlikely to be seen by their target audience.”⁹

15 31. In addition, “IP address targeting can help businesses to improve their overall
16 marketing strategy.”¹⁰ “By analyzing data on which households or businesses are responding to their

17 _____
18 ¹ *IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, ACCUDATA, <https://www.accudata.com/blog/ip-targeting/> (last visited April 24, 2024).

19 ² *Location-based Targeting That Puts You in Control*, CHOOZLE, <https://choozle.com/geotargeting-strategies/> (last visited April 24, 2024).

20 ³ Herbert Williams, *The Benefits of IP Address Targeting for Local Businesses*, LINKEDIN (Nov.
21 29, 2023), <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/benefits-ip-address-targeting-local-businesses-herbert-williams-z7bhf>.

22 ⁴ *IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, *supra* note 1.

23 ⁵ Trey Titone, *The future of IP address as an advertising identifier*, AD TECH EXPLAINED (May 16,
2022), <https://adtechexplained.com/the-future-of-ip-address-as-an-advertising-identifier/>.

24 ⁶ *See, e.g., IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, *supra* note 1.

25 ⁷ *See, e.g., Personalize Your Website And Digital Marketing Using IP Address*, GEOFLI,
<https://geofli.com/blog/how-to-use-ip-address-data-to-personalize-your-website-and-digital-marketing-campaigns> (last visited April 24, 2024).

26 ⁸ Williams, *supra* note 3.

27 ⁹ *Id.*

28 ¹⁰ *Id.*

1 ads, businesses can refine their targeting strategy and improve their overall marketing efforts.”¹¹

2 32. As alleged below, Defendant installs each of the Trackers on the user’s browser for
3 marketing and analytics purposes, and the Trackers collect information—users’ IP addresses—that
4 identifies the outgoing “routing, addressing, or signaling information” of the user. Accordingly, the
5 Trackers are each “pen registers.”

6 *1. GumGum Tracker*

7 33. GumGum, Inc. (“GumGum”) is a software-as-a-service company that develops the
8 GumGum Tracker, which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

9 34. According to GumGum, it “delivers the next generation of contextual intelligence,
10 industry leading ad creatives, and the ability to measure and optimize advertising campaigns to better
11 understand a consumer’s mindset that captures attention and drives action and outcomes.”¹²

12 35. In other words, GumGum enables companies to sell advertising space on their
13 websites, thereby earning revenue, and allows companies to place advertisements on other
14 companies’ websites, thereby driving brand awareness and sales. To achieve this, GumGum uses its
15 Tracker to receive, store, and analyze information collected from website visitors, such as visitors of
16 Defendant’s Website.

17 36. The first time a user visits Defendant’s Website, the user’s browser sends an HTTP
18 request to Defendant’s server, and Defendant’s server sends an HTTP response with directions to
19 install the GumGum Tracker on the user’s browser. The GumGum Tracker, in turn, instructs the
20 user’s browser to send GumGum the user’s IP address.


21 37. Moreover, GumGum stores a cookie in the user’s browser cache. When the user
22 subsequently visits Defendant’s Website, the GumGum Tracker locates the cookie identifier stored
23 on the user’s browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the GumGum Tracker causes the
24 browser to send the cookie along with the user’s IP address to GumGum. A general diagram of this
25 process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the Website causes the GumGum Tracker to
26 install a cookie on the user’s browser and instructs the user’s browser to send the user’s IP address

27 ¹¹ *Id.*

28 ¹² *About*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/about> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

through the cookie. See Figure 2.

Figure 2:



38. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the GumGum Tracker from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant’s Website the process begins over again: (i) Defendant’s server installs the GumGum Tracker on the user’s browser, (ii) the GumGum Tracker instructs the browser to send GumGum the user’s IP address, (iii) the GumGum Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) GumGum will continue to receive the user’s IP address on subsequent Website visits with the cookie transmission. See Figures 3 and 4 (showing IP address being transmitted along with the cookie).

Figure 3:





Figure 4:



39. The GumGum Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” *Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

40. Further, the GumGum Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to work, it must be run on some kind of computing device.” *James v. Walt Disney Co.*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2023 WL 7392285, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2023).

41. Because the GumGum Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP address—from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA section 638.50(b).

2. *Audiencerate Tracker*

42. Audiencerate LTD (“Audiencerate”) is a software-as-a-service company that develops the Audiencerate Tracker, which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

43. According to Audiencerate, it “enable[s] data-driven advertising via [its] proprietary

1 technology and platforms.”¹³

2 44. “One side of [Audiencerate’s] business is dedicated to helping data owners monetize
3 their data and license audiences in the world’s largest programmatic media buying marketplaces.
4 The other side provides targeting data to marketers, enabling them to model and target audiences
5 with more complexity and sophistication.”¹⁴

6 45. Just like GumGum, Audiencerate uses its Tracker to receive, store, and analyze data
7 sent collected from website visitors, including visitors of Defendant’s Website.

8 46. As discussed above, the first time a user visits Defendant’s Website, the user’s
9 browser sends an HTTP request to Defendant’s server, and Defendant’s server sends the HTTP
10 response. This response also includes directions to install the Audiencerate Tracker on the user’s
11 browser. The Audiencerate Tracker, in turn, instructs the user’s browser to send the user’s IP address
12 to Audiencerate.

13 47. Moreover, Audiencerate stores a cookie in the user’s browser cache. When the user
14 subsequently visits Defendant’s Website, the Audiencerate Tracker locates the cookie identifier
15 stored on the user’s browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the Audiencerate Tracker causes
16 the browser to send the cookie along with the user’s IP address to Audiencerate. A general diagram
17 of this process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the Website causes the Audiencerate
18 Tracker to install a cookie on the user’s browser instructs the user’s browser to send the user’s IP
19 address through the cookie. *See* Figure 2, *supra*.


20 48. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the Audiencerate Tracker
21 from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant’s Website, the process begins
22 over again: (i) Defendant’s server installs the Audiencerate Tracker on the user’s browser, (ii) the
23 Audiencerate Tracker instructs the browser to send Audiencerate the user’s IP address, (iii) the
24 Audiencerate Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) Audiencerate will continue to
25 receive the user’s IP address through the cookie on subsequent Website visits with the cookie

26 _____
¹³ AUDIENCERATE, <https://www.audiencerate.com/> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

27 ¹⁴ *AWS Enables Audiencerate to Process Over a Billion Requests per Week*, AWS (2020),
28 <https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/audiencerate-case-study/>.

transmission. See Figure 5 (showing IP address being transmitted along with the cookie).

Figure 5:



https://a.audrte.com/p

0021!ip#68.185.130.178; arckid
GEM-QIQQOiwv7CnoZyg2

49. The Audiencerate Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” *Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

50. Further, the Audiencerate Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to work, it must be run on some kind of computing device.” *James, supra*, 2023 WL 7392285, at *13.

51. Because the Audiencerate Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP address—from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA section 638.50(b).

3. TripleLift Tracker

52. TripleLift is a software-as-a-service company that develops the TripleLift Tracker, which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

53. According to TripleLift, its “technology powers ads that make advertising better for everyone—higher performing for brands, more lucrative for publishers and more respectful of the

1 consumer's experience."¹⁵

2 54. In other words, TripleLift enables companies to sell advertising space on their
3 websites, thereby earning revenue, and allows companies to place advertisements on other
4 companies' websites, thereby driving brand awareness and sales. To achieve this, TripleLift uses its
5 Tracker to receive, store, and analyze information collected from website visitors, such as visitors of
6 Defendant's Website.

7 55. The first time a user visits Defendant's Website, the user's browser sends an HTTP
8 request to Defendant's server, and Defendant's server sends an HTTP response with directions to
9 install the TripleLift Tracker on the user's browser. The TripleLift Tracker, in turn, instructs the
10 user's browser to send TripleLift the user's IP address.

11 56. Moreover, TripleLift stores a cookie in the user's browser cache. When the user
12 subsequently visits Defendant's Website, the TripleLift Tracker locates the cookie identifier stored
13 on the user's browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the TripleLift Tracker causes the
14 browser to send the cookie along with the user's IP address to TripleLift. A general diagram of this
15 process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the Website causes the TripleLift Tracker to
16 install a cookie on the user's browser instructs the user's browser to send the user's IP address
17 through the cookie. *See* Figure 2, *supra*.

18 57. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the TripleLift Tracker
19 from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant's Website the process begins
20 over again: (i) Defendant's server installs the TripleLift Tracker on the user's browser, (ii) the
21 TripleLift Tracker instructs the browser to send TripleLift the user's IP address, (iii) the TripleLift
22 Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) TripleLift will continue to receive the user's
23 IP address on subsequent Website visits with the cookie transmission. *See* Figure 6 (showing IP
24 address being transmitted along with the cookie).

25
26
27 _____
28 ¹⁵ *Technology*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/technology> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

1 59. The TripleLift Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies
2 consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” *Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

3 60. Further, the TripleLift Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to work,
4 it must be run on some kind of computing device.” *See, e.g., James v. Walt Disney Co.*, --- F. Supp.
5 3d ---, 2023 WL 7392285, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2023).

6 61. Because the TripleLift Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP address—
7 from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA section 638.50(b).

8 **B. Defendant Installed And Used The Trackers On Plaintiffs’ and
9 Users’ Browsers Without Prior Consent Or A Court Order**

10 62. Defendant owns and operates the Website, Gamespot.com, which is a video gaming
11 website that provides news, reviews, previews, downloads, and other information on video games.

12 63. When companies build their websites, they install or integrate various third-party
13 scripts into the code of the website in order to collect data from users or perform other functions.¹⁶

14 64. Often times, third-party scripts are installed on websites “for advertising purposes.”¹⁷

15 65. Further, “[i]f the same third-party tracker is present on many sites, it can build a more
16 complete profile of the user over time.”¹⁸

17 66. Defendant has long incorporated the code of the Trackers into the code of its Website,
18 including when Plaintiffs and other users visited the Website. Thus, when Plaintiffs and other users
19 visited the Website, the Website caused the Trackers to be installed on Plaintiffs’ and other users’
20 browsers.

21 67. As outlined above, when a user visits the Website, the Website’s code—as
22 programmed by Defendant—installs the Trackers onto the user’s browser.

23 68. Upon installing the Trackers on its Website, Defendant uses the Trackers to collect
24 the IP address of visitors to the Website, including the IP address of Plaintiffs and Class Members.

25 ¹⁶ *See* THIRD-PARTY TRACKING, <https://piwik.pro/glossary/third-party-tracking/> (“Third-party
26 tracking refers to the practice by which a tracker, other than the website directly visited by the user,
27 traces or assists in tracking the user’s visit to the site. Third-party trackers are snippets of code that
28 are present on multiple websites. They collect and send information about a user’s browsing history
to other companies...”).

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Id.*

1 See Figures 3-6, *supra*.

2 69. The operators of the Trackers then use the IP address of Website visitors, including
3 those of Plaintiffs and Class Members, to serve targeted advertisements and conduct website
4 analytics.

5 70. At no time prior to the installation and use of the Trackers on Plaintiffs' and Class
6 Members's browsers, or prior to the use of the Trackers, did Defendant procure Plaintiffs' and Class
7 Members's consent for such conduct. Nor did Defendant obtain a court order to install or use the
8 Trackers.

9 **C. Defendant's Conduct Constitutes An Invasion Of Plaintiffs' And
Class Members' Privacy**

10 71. The collection of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personally identifying, non-
11 anonymized information through Defendant's installation and use of the Trackers constitutes an
12 invasion of privacy.

13 72. As alleged herein, the Trackers are designed to analyze Website data and marketing
14 campaigns, conduct targeted advertising, and boost Defendant's revenue, all through their
15 surreptitious collection of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' data.

16 *1. Defendant Uses The GumGum Tracker For The Purposes Of
Marketing, Advertising, And Analytics*

17 73. GumGum is a digital advertising platform that prides itself on its "ability to measure
18 and optimize advertising campaigns to better understand a consumer's mindset that captures
19 attention and drives action and outcomes."¹⁹

20 74. GumGum helps companies like Defendant market, advertise, and analyze user data
21 from its website. One way GumGum assists with marketing and advertising is through its Ad
22 Exchange, which is a direct marketplace where publishers and advertisers can buy and sell digital
23 advertising space.²⁰ Thus, when a user enters a website, GumGum enables companies to
24 instantaneously buy and sell ad space in a way that it optimized to the particular user.

25 75. According to GumGum, it uses artificial intelligence to scan the information on a web
26


27 ¹⁹ *About*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/about> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

28 ²⁰ *Exchange*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/exchange> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

1 page to “deliver ads that are always relevant and align with what users are watching, reading and
 2 browsing online.”²¹ GumGum boasts that their “solution offers higher quality ads and increased
 3 scale across thousands of premium publisher sites” and “allow[s] advertisers to maximize their KPIs
 4 by targeting audience through customized segments such as multicultural and sustainability.”²²

5 76. Notably, GumGum claims that it uses “cookieless targeting” to drive significant brand
 6 KPIs, thereby not collecting personal identifiable information.²³ However, GumGum is setting a
 7 visitor cookie for the user session, which transmits a user’s IP address and other pieces of
 8 information. *See* Figure 7.

9 **Figure 7:**




77. Indeed, GumGum is actually listed as a cookie when using browser developer tools
 to examine the Website. *See* Figure 8.

²¹ *Contextual vs. Behavioral Targeting*, GUMGUM (Dec. 29, 2022), <https://gumgum.com/blog/contextual-vs-behavioral-targeting>.

²² *GumGum Announces Industry’s First 100% Brand Safe Ad Exchange*, GUMGUM (March 15, 2023), <https://gumgum.com/press-releases/brand-safe-exchange>.

²³ *Verity*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/verity> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

Figure 8:

78. In other words, when users visit Defendant’s Website, GumGum collects users’ IP addresses through its GumGum Tracker so that Defendant can analyze user data, create and analyze the performance of marketing campaigns, and target specific users or specific groups of users for advertisements. All of this helps Defendant further monetize its Website and maximize revenue by allowing third parties to collect user information.

2. *Defendant Uses The Audiencerate Tracker For The Purposes Of Marketing, Advertising, And Analytics*

79. Whereas GumGum specifically enables advertisements on websites, Audiencerate is a data platform that helps companies with audience-based marketing, advertising, and analysis.


80. Companies such as Defendant share their users’ data with Audiencerate through “daily synchronization” via the Audiencerate Tracker.²⁴ Audiencerate claims to anonymize the data and organizes it into segments.²⁵ Then, companies use the segmented data to run targeted campaigns

²⁴ AUDIENCERATE, <https://www.audiencerate.com/> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

²⁵ *Product Overview*, AUDIENCERATE, <https://app.audiencerate.com/doc/home> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

1 and perform data analysis through Audiencerate's platform.²⁶ See Figure 9.

2 **Figure 9:**



11 81. In addition to helping companies make better use of their own customer data,
12 Audiencerate helps companies *sell* their customers' data to further "monetize data."²⁷

13 82. In order to perform the functions listed above, Audiencerate needs to collect data that
14 identifies a particular user. This is why Audiencerate collects IP addresses: it allows Audiencerate
15 to segment users in order to run targeted campaigns and perform data analysis.

16 83. In other words, companies like Defendant are allowing Audiencerate to collect users'
17 data to increase Defendant's revenue, whether it is by optimizing marketing campaigns or by purely
18 selling the data.

19 3. *Defendant Uses The TripleLift Tracker For The Purposes Of*
20 *Marketing, Advertising, And Analytics*

21 84. TripleLift describes itself as a digital advertising platform that "work[s] for everyone:
22 publishers who seek greater monetization, advertisers who require better performance, [and]
23 consumers who want better ad experiences."²⁸

24 85. TripleLift helps companies like Defendant market, advertise, and analyze user data

25 ²⁶ *Id.*

26 ²⁷ *Audiencerate partnership sees Sirdata integrated on Adform marketplace for the first time*,
27 SIRDATA (Dec. 10, 2020), <https://news.sirdata.com/en/press-release-audiencerate-sirdata-partnership/>.

28 ²⁸ *Who We Are*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/company> (last visited April 24, 2024).

1 from its website. For example, TripleLift enables publishers to place advertisements on their
2 webpages, in videos, or embedded in broadcasts. To ensure that an effective advertisement is shown
3 to the consumer, the publisher shares data about the user with TripleLift and TripleLift serves the
4 targeted ad.²⁹

5 86. TripleLift also helps advertisers select where to place their ads through “TripleLift
6 Audiences,” which “span[s] third-party and first-party data.”³⁰ In other words, TripleLift utilizes
7 third-party data, as well as data from the publisher where the ad is ultimately placed (*i.e.*, first-party),
8 to determine where to place advertisers’ ads and who to place them in front of.

9 87. By way of example, if a home-goods brand wants to use TripleLift to serve its ads, it
10 can purchase TripleLift’s “Home Curated Deal” to reach “people who are investing their time and
11 money close to home.”³¹ By choosing this set of data, the home-goods brand will be able to target
12 “audiences spending time on home improvement, home entertaining, outfitting their setups,
13 browsing real estate, raising kids and adopting pets.”³² This data set can be used for ads in the
14 “Native, Display and Video” formats, “in placements known to deliver high viewability and high
15 video completion rates.”³³ TripleLift ensures that the data sets “are refreshed on an on-going basis
16 so that only the highest performing placements are included.”³⁴

17 88. In other words, when users visit Defendant’s Website, TripleLift collects users’ IP
18 addresses through its TripleLift Tracker so that Defendant can analyze user data, create and analyze
19 the performance of marketing campaigns, and target specific users or specific groups of users for
20 advertisements. All of this helps Defendant further monetize its Website and maximize revenue by
21 allowing third parties to collect user information.

22 _____
23 ²⁹ See *Smart Data & Targeting For Publishers*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/products/audiences-publishers> (last visited April 24, 2024).

24 ³⁰ *Smart Data & Targeting For Advertisers*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/products/audiences-advertisers> (last visited April 24, 2024).

25 ³¹ *HOME*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/exchange-traded-deals/home>
26 (last visited April 24, 2024).

27 ³² *Id.*

28 ³³ *Id.*

³⁴ *Id.*

III. PLAINTIFFS' EXPERIENCE

1. Plaintiff Shah

89. Plaintiff Shah has visited the Website multiple times—including as long ago as June 2023 and as recently as January 2024—on his desktop browser.

90. When Plaintiff Shah visited the Website, the Website's code—as programmed by Defendant—caused the GumGum and Audiencerate Trackers to be installed on Plaintiff Shah's browser. Defendant, GumGum, and Audiencerate, then used the Trackers to collect Plaintiff Shah's IP address. *See* Figures 10 (GumGum Tracker) and 11 (Audiencerate Tracker).

Figure 10:

```

GET | rtb.gumgum.com | /usync/15581?r=https%3A%2F%2Fsync.e-planning.net%252Fdc%3D1a6b1d3b3872943b%26f%3D9d0099d71b3ef3b5%26uid%3D... | 16:47:18 | 206 ms | Complete
Filter:
Overview Contents Summary Chart Notes
:authority rtb.gumgum.com
:method GET
:path /usync/15581?r=https%3A%2F%2Fsync.e-planning.net%252Fdc%3D1a6b1d3b3872943b%26f%3D9d0099d71b3ef3b5%26uid%3D
:scheme https
accept text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
accept-encoding gzip, deflate, br
accept-language en-US,en;q=0.9
cookie vst=u_48df0c3f-9965-471b-ab68-eb6c681540e7
dnt 1
referer https://ads.us.e-planning.net/
sec-ch-ua "Not_A Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="120", "Google Chrome";v="120"
sec-ch-ua-mobile ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform "macOS"
sec-fetch-dest iframe
sec-fetch-mode navigate
sec-fetch-site cross-site
upgrade-insecure-requests 1
user-agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Headers Query String Cookies Raw

```

Figure 11:

```

200 | GET | a.audite.com | /p | 16:47:22 | 216 ms | 1.25 KB | Complete | ...
Filter:
Overview Contents Summary Chart Notes
GET /p HTTP/1.1
Accept image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,image/svg+xml,image/*,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Encoding gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language en-US,en;q=0.9
Connection keep-alive
Cookie arcki2=hgbDFalr0-lRuaDRfwTe-DiUw2022090811704318441888ip#76.169.26.164;arcki2_ddp2=hgbDFalr0-lRuaDRfwTe-DiUw2022090811704318442746;arcki2_adform=48863449269298573441202...
DNT 1
Host a.audite.com
Referer https://ssbsync.smartadserver.com/
Sec-Fetch-Dest image
Sec-Fetch-Mode no-cors
Sec-Fetch-Site cross-site
User-Agent Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
sec-ch-ua "Not_A Brand";v="8", "Chromium";v="120", "Google Chrome";v="120"
sec-ch-ua-mobile ?0
sec-ch-ua-platform "macOS"
Headers Cookies Raw

```

91. Because Plaintiff Shah had previously visited the Website but not cleared his cookies at the time the data in Figure 10 was collected, Plaintiff Shah's IP address was sent to GumGum via the GumGum cookie, as opposed to being sent as standalone data as it would have been on Plaintiff Shah's first visit to the Website. However, as noted above, the IP address is transmitted within the cookie. *See* Figures 7 and 8, *supra*.

1 92. Defendant, GumGum, and Audiencerate used the information collected by the
2 Trackers to analyze Website data and marketing campaigns, conducted targeted advertising based
3 on Plaintiff Shah’s location, and ultimately boost Defendant’s and advertisers’ revenue.

4 93. Plaintiff Shah did not provide his prior consent to Defendant to install or use the
5 GumGum or Audiencerate Trackers on his browser.

6 94. Defendant did not obtain a court order before installing or using the GumGum or
7 Audiencerate Trackers.

8 95. Plaintiff Shah has, therefore, had his privacy invaded by Defendant’s violations of
9 CIPA section 638.51(a).

10 2. *Plaintiff Kim*

11 96. Plaintiff Kim has visited the Website multiple times—including as long ago as July
12 2023 and as recently as December 2023—on his desktop browser.

13 97. When Plaintiff Kim visited the Website, the Website’s code—as programmed by
14 Defendant—caused the TripleLift Tracker to be installed on Plaintiff Kim’s browser. Defendant
15 and TripleLift then used the Tracker to collect Plaintiff Kim’s IP address. *See Figure 6, supra.*³⁵

16 98. Defendant and TripleLift used the information collected by the TripleLift Tracker to
17 analyze Website data and marketing campaigns, conduct targeted advertising, and ultimately boost
18 Defendant’s and advertisers’ revenue.

19 99. Plaintiff Kim did not provide his prior consent to Defendant to install or use the
20 TripleLift Tracker on Plaintiff Kim’s browser.

21 100. Defendant did not obtain a court order before installing or using the TripleLift
22 Tracker.

23 101. Plaintiff Kim has, therefore, had his privacy invaded by Defendant’s violations of
24 CIPA section 638.51(a).

25
26
27 ³⁵ At the time Plaintiff Kim retained counsel and did confirmatory testing, he was located in
28 Indiana. However, during the time relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff Kim was located in
California, as alleged above.

1 merits of this litigation. Moreover, the Class is ascertainable and identifiable from Defendant's
2 records.

3 109. **Commonality and Predominance:** There are well-defined common questions of fact
4 and law that exist as to all members of the Class and that predominate over any questions affecting
5 only individual members of the Class. These common legal and factual questions, which do not vary
6 between members of the Class, and which may be determined without reference to the individual
7 circumstances of any Class Member, include, but are not limited to, the following:

- 8 (a) Whether Defendant violated CIPA section 638.51(a);
- 9 (b) Whether the Trackers are "pen registers" pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
10 section 638.50(b);
- 11 (c) Whether Defendant sought or obtained prior consent—express or
12 otherwise—from Plaintiffs and the Class;
- 13 (d) Whether Defendant sought or obtained a court order for its use of the
14 Trackers; and
- 15 (e) Whether Plaintiffs and members of the Class are entitled to actual
16 and/or statutory damages for the aforementioned violations.

17 110. **Typicality:** The claims of the named Plaintiffs are typical of the claims of the Class
18 because the named Plaintiffs, like all other members of the Class Members, visited the Website and
19 had their IP addresses collected by the Trackers, which were installed and used by Defendant.

20 111. **Adequate Representation:** Plaintiffs are adequate representatives of the Class
21 because their interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members they seek to represent,
22 they have retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and they intend to
23 prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately
24 protected by Plaintiffs and their counsel.

25 112. **Superiority:** The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the fair
26 and efficient adjudication of the claims of members of the Class. Each individual member of the
27 Class may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the
28 complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant's liability. Individualized
litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial
system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also

1 presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device
2 presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy
3 of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendant’s liability. Class
4 treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for
5 consistent adjudication of the liability issues.

6 CAUSES OF ACTION

7 COUNT I

8 **Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, 9 Cal. Penal Code § 638.51(a)**

10 113. Plaintiffs repeat the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if fully set
11 forth herein.

12 114. Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the proposed
13 Class against Defendant.

14 115. CIPA section 638.51(a) proscribes any “person” from “install[ing] or us[ing] a pen
15 register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order.”

16 116. A “pen register” is a “a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing,
17 addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
18 electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code
19 § 638.50(b).

20 117. The Trackers are “pen registers” because they are “device[s] or process[es]” that
21 “capture[d]” the “routing, addressing, or signaling information”—the IP address—from the
22 electronic communications transmitted by Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s computers or smartphones. Cal.
23 Penal Code § 638.50(b).

24 118. At all relevant times, Defendant installed the Trackers—which are pen registers—on
25 Plaintiffs’ and Class Members’ browsers, and used the Trackers to collect Plaintiffs’ and Class
26 Members’ IP addresses.

27 119. The Trackers do not collect the content of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’s electronic
28 communications with the Website. *In re Zynga Privacy Litig.*, 750 F.3d 1098, 1108 (9th Cir. 2014)

1 (“IP addresses constitute addressing information and do not necessarily reveal any more about the
2 underlying contents of communication...”)(cleaned up).

3 120. Plaintiffs and Class Members did not provide their prior consent to Defendant’s
4 installation or use of the Trackers.

5 121. Defendant did not obtain a court order to install or use the Trackers.

6 122. Pursuant to Cal. Penal Code section 637.2, Plaintiffs and Class Members have been
7 injured by Defendant’s violations of CIPA section 638.51(a), and each seeks statutory damages of
8 \$5,000 for each of Defendant’s violations of CIPA section 638.51(a).

9 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

10 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, seek
11 judgment against Defendant, as follows:

- 12 (a) For an order certifying the Class, naming Plaintiffs as the
13 representatives of the Class, and naming Plaintiffs’ attorneys as Class
14 Counsel to represent the Class;
- 15 (b) For an order declaring that Defendant’s conduct violates the statutes
16 referenced herein;
- 17 (c) For an order finding in favor of Plaintiffs and the Class on all counts
18 asserted herein;
- 19 (d) For statutory damages of \$5,000 for each violation of CIPA
20 section 638.51(a);
- 21 (e) For pre- and post-judgment interest on all amounts awarded;
- 22 (f) For an order of restitution and all other forms of equitable monetary
23 relief; and
- 24 (g) For an order awarding and the Class their reasonable attorney’s fees and
25 expenses and costs of suit.

26 **JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

27 Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of any and all issues in this action so triable of right.

28 Dated: April 29, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.

By: /s/ L. Timothy Fisher
L. Timothy Fisher

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L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
Emily A. Horne (State Bar No. 347723)
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
ehorne@bursor.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.

L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
Emily A. Horne (State Bar No. 347723)
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
ehorne@bursor.com

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCONORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

VISHAL SHAH and JAYDEN KIM, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

Plaintiffs,

v.

FANDOM, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 3:24-cv-01062-RFL

FIRST AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

1 Plaintiffs Vishal Shah and Jayden Kim (“Plaintiffs”), individually and on behalf of all others
2 similarly situated, by and through his-their attorneys, makes the following allegations pursuant to
3 the investigation of his-their counsel and based upon information and belief, except as to allegations
4 specifically pertaining to himself-themselves and his-their counsel, which are based on personal
5 knowledge.

6 NATURE OF THE ACTION

7 1. Defendant Fandom, Inc. (“Defendant”) owns and operates a website, Gamespot.com
8 (the “Website” or “Gamespot”).

9 2. When users visit the Website, Defendant causes ~~two~~three trackers—the GumGum
10 Tracker, ~~and~~ Audiencerate Tracker, and TripleLift Tracker (the “Trackers”)—to be installed on
11 Website visitors’ internet browsers. Defendant then uses these Trackers to collect Website visitors’
12 IP addresses.

13 3. Because the Trackers capture Website visitors’ “routing, addressing, or signaling
14 information,” the Trackers each constitute a “pen register” under Section 638.50(b) of the California
15 Invasion of Privacy Act (“CIPA”). Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b); *see also Greenley v. Kochava, Inc.*,
16 2023 WL 4833466 (S.D. Cal. July 27, 2023).

17 4. By installing and using the Trackers without Plaintiffs’s prior consent and without a
18 court order, Defendant violated CIPA §-section 638.51(a).

19 5. Plaintiffs brings this action to prevent Defendant from further violating the privacy
20 rights of California residents, and to recover statutory damages for Defendant’s violation of CIPA
21 §-section 638.51.

22 PARTIES

23 6. Plaintiff Shah resides in Orange County, California and has an intent to remain there,
24 and is therefore a citizen of California. Plaintiff Shah was in California when he visited the Website.

25 6-7. Plaintiff Kim resides in San Jose, California and has an intent to remain there, and is
26 therefore a citizen of California. Plaintiff Kim was in California when he visited the Website.

27 7-8. Defendant Fandom, Inc. is a California-Delaware company corporation, with its
28 principal place of business located in California.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1
2 8.9. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to ~~Article VI,~~
3 ~~Section 10 of the California Constitution and Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10. This action is brought~~
4 ~~as a class action on behalf of Plaintiff and Class Members pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 382.28~~
5 ~~U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(a) because this case is a class action where the aggregate claims of all members~~
6 ~~of the proposed class are in excess of \$5,000,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs, there are over~~
7 ~~100 members of the putative class, and at least one class member is a citizen of a different state than~~
8 ~~Defendant.~~

9 9.10. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because it is headquartered ~~and~~
10 ~~incorporated~~ in California.

11 10.11. Venue is proper ~~pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) in this County~~ because Defendant
12 resides in this ~~County~~ District.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

13
14 **I. THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**

15 11.12. The California Legislature enacted CIPA to protect certain privacy rights of
16 California citizens. The California Legislature expressly recognized that ““the development of new
17 devices and techniques for the purpose of eavesdropping upon private communications ... has
18 created a serious threat to the free exercise of personal liberties and cannot be tolerated in a free and
19 civilized society.” Cal. Penal Code § 630.

20 12.13. As relevant here, CIPA ~~§-section~~ 638.51(a) proscribes any “person” from “install[ing]
21 or us[ing] a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order.”

22 13.14. A “pen register” is a “a device or process that records or decodes dialing, routing,
23 addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or
24 electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code
25 § 638.50(b).

26 14.15. A “trap and trace device” is a “a device or process that captures the incoming
27 electronic or other impulses that identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing,
28

1 or signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
2 communication, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b).

3 15-16. In plain English, a “pen register” is a “device or process” that records *outgoing*
4 information, while a “trap and trace device” is a “device or process” that records *incoming*
5 information.

6 16-17. Historically, law enforcement used “pen registers” to record the numbers of outgoing
7 calls from a particular telephone line, while law enforcement used “trap and trace devices” to record
8 the numbers of incoming calls to that particular telephone line. As technology advanced, however,
9 courts have expanded the application of these surveillance devices.

10 17-18. For example, if a user sends an email, a “pen register” might record the email address
11 it was sent from, the email address the email was sent to, and the subject line—because this is the
12 user’s *outgoing* information. On the other hand, if that same user receives an email, a “trap and trace
13 device” might record the email address it was sent from, the email address it was sent to, and the
14 subject line—because this is *incoming* information that is being sent to that same user.

15 18-19. Although CIPA was enacted before the dawn of the Internet, “the California Supreme
16 Court regularly reads statutes to apply to new technologies where such a reading would not conflict
17 with the statutory scheme.” *In re Google Inc.*, 2013 WL 5423918, at *21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013);
18 *see also Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15 (referencing CIPA’s “expansive language” when
19 finding software was a “pen register”); *Javier v. Assurance IQ, LLC*, 2022 WL 1744107, at *1 (9th
20 Cir. May 31, 2022) (“Though written in terms of wiretapping, [CIPA] Section 631(a) applies to
21 Internet communications.”). This accords with the fact that, “when faced with two possible
22 interpretations of CIPA, the California Supreme Court has construed CIPA in accordance with the
23 interpretation that provides the greatest privacy protection.” *Matera v. Google Inc.*, 2016 WL
24 8200619, at *19 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016).

25 19-20. Individuals may bring an action against the violator of any provision of CIPA—
26 including CIPA §-section 638.51—for \$5,000 per violation. Cal. Penal Code § 637.2(a)(1).


27 **II. DEFENDANT VIOLATES THE CALIFORNIA INVASION OF PRIVACY ACT**

28 **A. The Trackers Are “Pen Registers”**

1 20-21. To make Defendant’s Website load on a user’s internet browser, the browser sends
2 an “HTTP request” or “GET” request to Defendant’s server where the relevant Website data is stored.
3 In response to the request, Defendant’s server sends an “HTTP response” back to the browser with
4 a set of instructions. A general diagram of this process is pictured at Figure 1, which explains how
5 Defendant’s Website transmits instructions back to users’ browsers in response to HTTP requests.

6 See Figure 1.

7 **Figure 1:**



14 21-22. The server’s instructions include how to properly display the Website—*e.g.*, what
15 images to load, what text should appear, or what music should play.

16 22-23. In addition, the server’s instructions cause the Trackers to be installed on a user’s
17 browser. The Trackers then cause the browser to send identifying information—including the
18 user’s IP address—to GumGum, ~~and~~ Audiencerate, and TripleLift.

19 24. The IP address is a unique identifier for a device, which is expressed as four sets of
20 numbers separated by periods (*e.g.*, 192.168.123.132). The first two sets of numbers indicate what
21 network the device is on (*e.g.*, 192.168), and the second two sets of numbers identify the specific
22 device (*e.g.*, 123.132).

23 25. Thus, the IP address enables a device to communicate with another device—such as
24 a computer’s browser communicating with a server—and the IP address contains geographical
25 location.

26 23. Through an IP address, the specific device’s state, city, and zip code can be
27 determined.

1 26.

2 27. Much like a telephone number, an IP address is a unique numerical code associated
3 with a specific internet-connected device. Thus, knowing a user’s IP address—and therefore
4 geographical location—”provide[s] a level of specificity previously unfound in marketing.”¹

5 28. An IP address allows advertisers to (i) “[t]arget [customers by] countries, cities,
6 neighborhoods, and ... postal code”² and (ii) “to target specific households, businesses[,] and even
7 individuals with ads that are relevant to their interests.”³ Indeed, “IP targeting is one of the most
8 targeted marketing techniques [companies] can employ to spread the word about [a] product or
9 service”⁴ because “[c]ompanies can use an IP address ... to personally identify individuals.”⁵

10 29. For example, businesses who are trying to reach college-aged demographics can
11 target devices on college campuses by sending advertisements to IP addresses associated with
12 college-wide Wi-Fis.⁶ Or, for a job fair in specific city, companies can send advertisements to only
13 those in the general location of the upcoming event.⁷

14 30. In addition to “reach[ing] their target audience with greater precision,” businesses are
15 incentivized to use a customer’s IP address because it “can be more cost-effective than other forms
16 of advertising.”⁸ “By targeting specific households or businesses, businesses can avoid wasting
17 money on ads that are unlikely to be seen by their target audience.”⁹

18 ¹ *IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, ACCUDATA,
19 <https://www.accudata.com/blog/ip-targeting/> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

20 ² *Location-based Targeting That Puts You in Control*, CHOOZLE, <https://choozle.com/geotargeting-strategies/> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

21 ³ Herbert Williams, *The Benefits of IP Address Targeting for Local Businesses*, LINKEDIN (Nov.
22 29, 2023), <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/benefits-ip-address-targeting-local-businesses-herbert-williams-z7bhf>.

23 ⁴ *IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, *supra* note 1.

24 ⁵ Trey Titone, *The future of IP address as an advertising identifier*, AD TECH EXPLAINED (May 16,
25 2022), <https://adtechexplained.com/the-future-of-ip-address-as-an-advertising-identifier/>.

26 ⁶ See, e.g., *IP Targeting: Understanding This Essential Marketing Tool*, *supra* note 1.

27 ⁷ See, e.g., *Personalize Your Website And Digital Marketing Using IP Address*, GEOFLI,
28 <https://geofli.com/blog/how-to-use-ip-address-data-to-personalize-your-website-and-digital-marketing-campaigns> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

⁸ Williams, *supra* note 3.

⁹ *Id.*

1 31. In addition, “IP address targeting can help businesses to improve their overall
2 marketing strategy.”¹⁰ “By analyzing data on which households or businesses are responding to their
3 ads, businesses can refine their targeting strategy and improve their overall marketing efforts.”¹¹

4 24.32. As alleged below, Defendant installs each of the Trackers on the user’s browser for
5 marketing and analytics purposes, and the Trackers collect information—users’ IP addresses—that
6 identifies the outgoing “routing, addressing, or signaling information” of the user. Accordingly, the
7 Trackers are each “pen registers.”

8 I. *GumGum Tracker*

9 25.33. GumGum, Inc. (“GumGum”) is a software-as-a-service company that develops the
10 GumGum Tracker, which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

11 26.34. According to GumGum, it “delivers the next generation of contextual intelligence,
12 industry leading ad creatives, and the ability to measure and optimize advertising campaigns to better
13 understand a consumer’s mindset that captures attention and drives action and outcomes.”¹²

14 27.35. In other words, GumGum enables companies to sell advertising space on their
15 websites, thereby earning revenue, and allows companies to place advertisements on other
16 companies’ websites, thereby driving brand awareness and sales. To achieve this, GumGum uses its
17 Tracker to receive, store, and analyze information collected from website visitors, such as visitors of
18 Defendant’s Website.

19 28.36. The first time a user visits Defendant’s Website, the user’s browser sends an HTTP
20 request to Defendant’s server, and Defendant’s server sends an HTTP response with directions to
21 install the GumGum Tracker on the user’s browser. The GumGum Tracker, in turn, instructs the
22 user’s browser to send GumGum the user’s IP address.

23 29.37. Moreover, GumGum stores a cookie ~~with the user’s IP address~~ in the user’s browser
24 cache. When the user subsequently visits Defendant’s Website, the GumGum Tracker locates the
25 cookie identifier stored on the user’s browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the GumGum


26 ¹⁰ *Id.*

27 ¹¹ *Id.*

28 ¹² *About*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/about> (last visited ~~Apr. 2~~Jan. 4, 2024).

1 Tracker causes the browser to send the cookie along with the user's IP address to GumGum. A
 2 general diagram of this process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the Website causes the
 3 GumGum Tracker to install a cookie on the user's browser and instructs the user's browser to send
 4 the user's IP address through the cookie. See Figure 2.

5 **Figure 2:**



13 30-38. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the GumGum Tracker
 14 from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant's Website the process begins
 15 over again: (i) Defendant's server installs the GumGum Tracker on the user's browser, (ii) the
 16 GumGum Tracker instructs the browser to send GumGum the user's IP address, (iii) the GumGum
 17 Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) GumGum will continue to receive the user's
 18 IP address on subsequent Website visits through-with the cookie transmission. See Figures 3 and 4
 19 (showing IP address being transmitted along with the cookie).

20 ~~31. In all cases, however, GumGum receives a user's IP address each and every time a~~
 21 ~~user interacts with the website of one of GumGum's clients, including Defendant's Website.~~

22 ~~32. Indeed, a user's IP address is contained along with the cookie transmission to~~
 23 ~~GumGum. See Figure 3.~~

24 **Figure 3:**

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
5589	2024-01-05 00:55:04.157300	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=535 Ack=2897 Win=83184 Len=0 TSval=1973414013 TSecr=2956654802
5610	2024-01-05 00:55:04.175984	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=535 Ack=4345 Win=83184 Len=0 TSval=1973414032 TSecr=2956654802
5620	2024-01-05 00:55:04.170846	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=535 Ack=3651 Win=83184 Len=0 TSval=1973414032 TSecr=2956654803
5722	2024-01-05 00:55:04.224253	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	192	Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
5794	2024-01-05 00:55:04.227336	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	185	Application Data
5814	2024-01-05 00:55:04.230826	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	585	Application Data
6018	2024-01-05 00:55:04.292543	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=1279 Ack=5822 Win=64000 Len=0 TSval=1973414148 TSecr=2956654925
6023	2024-01-05 00:55:04.292575	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=1279 Ack=5929 Win=64000 Len=0 TSval=1973414148 TSecr=2956654925
6025	2024-01-05 00:55:04.292584	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=1279 Ack=5929 Win=64000 Len=0 TSval=1973414148 TSecr=2956654943
6043	2024-01-05 00:55:04.296350	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	104	Application Data
6053	2024-01-05 00:55:04.299357	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=1317 Ack=7392 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=1973414154 TSecr=2956654959
7787	2024-01-05 00:55:04.764580	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	389	Application Data
8193	2024-01-05 00:55:04.833849	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [ACK] Seq=1540 Ack=7566 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=1973414690 TSecr=2956655473
12...	2024-02-05 00:55:05.936418	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	248	Application Data
12...	2024-01-05 00:55:05.936716	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TLSv1.2	188	Application Data
19...	2024-01-05 00:55:10.168475	192.168.68.79	rtb.gumgum.com	TCP	66	60848 → https(443) [FIN, ACK] Seq=5784 Ack=7763 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=1973428824 TSecr=2956656092




Figure 4:



33.39. The GumGum Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” *Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

34.40. Further, the GumGum Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to work, it must be run on some kind of computing device.” *James v. Walt Disney Co.*, --- F. Supp. 3d ---,

1 2023 WL 7392285, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2023).

2 ~~35.41.~~ Because the GumGum Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP address—
3 from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA ~~§~~ section 638.50(b).

4 2. *Audiencerate Tracker*

5 ~~36.42.~~ Audiencerate LTD (“Audiencerate”) is a software-as-a-service company that
6 develops the Audiencerate Tracker, which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

7 ~~37.43.~~ According to Audiencerate, it “enable[s] data-driven advertising via [its] proprietary
8 technology and platforms.”¹³

9 ~~38.44.~~ “One side of [Audiencerate’s] business is dedicated to helping data owners monetize
10 their data and license audiences in the world’s largest programmatic media buying marketplaces.
11 The other side provides targeting data to marketers, enabling them to model and target audiences
12 with more complexity and sophistication.”¹⁴

13 ~~39.45.~~ Just like GumGum, Audiencerate uses its Tracker to receive, store, and analyze data
14 sent collected from website visitors, ~~such as including~~ visitors of Defendant’s Website.

15 ~~40.46.~~ As discussed above, the first time a user visits Defendant’s Website, the user’s
16 browser sends an HTTP request to Defendant’s server, and Defendant’s server sends the HTTP
17 response. This response also includes directions to install the Audiencerate Tracker on the user’s
18 browser. The Audiencerate Tracker, in turn, instructs the user’s browser to send the user’s IP address
19 to Audiencerate.

20 ~~41.47.~~ Moreover, Audiencerate stores a cookie ~~with the user’s IP address~~ in the user’s
21 browser cache. When the user subsequently visits Defendant’s Website, the Audiencerate Tracker
22 locates the cookie identifier stored on the user’s browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the
23 Audiencerate Tracker causes the browser to send the cookie along with the user’s IP address to
24 Audiencerate. A general diagram of this process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the
25 Website causes the Audiencerate Tracker to install a cookie on the user’s browser instructs the user’s


26 ¹³ AUDIENCERATE, <https://www.audiencerate.com/> (last visited ~~Apr. 24~~ Jan. 4, 2024).

27 ¹⁴ *AWS Enables Audiencerate to Process Over a Billion Requests per Week*, AWS (2020),
28 <https://aws.amazon.com/solutions/case-studies/audiencerate-case-study/>.

1 browser to send the user’s IP address through the cookiesends the user’s IP address through the
 2 cookie. See Figure 2, supra.

3 48. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the Audiencerate Tracker
 4 from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant’s Website, the process begins
 5 over again: (i) Defendant’s server installs the Audiencerate Tracker on the user’s browser, (ii) the
 6 Audiencerate Tracker instructs the browser to send Audiencerate the user’s IP address, (iii) the
 7 Audiencerate Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) Audiencerate will continue to
 8 receive the user’s IP address through the cookie on each-subsequent Website visits with the cookie
 9 transmission. See Figure 5 (showing IP address being transmitted along with the cookie).

10 42. Figure 5:



11 https://a.audite.com/p

12 0021!ip#68.185.130.178; arck
 13 5EM-QIQQIQVwv7CnoZvnl2

14 43. In all cases, however, Audiencerate receives a user’s IP address each and every time
 15 a user interacts with the website of one of Audiencerate’s clients, including Defendant’s Website.

16 44.49. The Audiencerate Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies

1 consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” *Greenley, supra*, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

2 45-50. Further, the Audiencerate Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to
3 work, it must be run on some kind of computing device.” *James, supra*, 2023 WL 7392285, at *13.

4 46.—Because the Audiencerate Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP
5 address—from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA ~~§~~ section
6 638.50(b).

7 51.

8 3. *TripleLift Tracker*

9 52. TripleLift is a software-as-a-service company that develops the TripleLift Tracker,
10 which it provides to website owners, like Defendant, for a fee.

11 53. According to TripleLift, its “technology powers ads that make advertising better for
12 everyone—higher performing for brands, more lucrative for publishers and more respectful of the
13 consumer’s experience.”¹⁵

14 54. In other words, TripleLift enables companies to sell advertising space on their
15 websites, thereby earning revenue, and allows companies to place advertisements on other
16 companies’ websites, thereby driving brand awareness and sales. To achieve this, TripleLift uses its
17 Tracker to receive, store, and analyze information collected from website visitors, such as visitors of
18 Defendant’s Website.

19 55. The first time a user visits Defendant’s Website, the user’s browser sends an HTTP
20 request to Defendant’s server, and Defendant’s server sends an HTTP response with directions to
21 install the TripleLift Tracker on the user’s browser. The TripleLift Tracker, in turn, instructs the
22 user’s browser to send TripleLift the user’s IP address.

23 56. Moreover, TripleLift stores a cookie in the user’s browser cache. When the user
24 subsequently visits Defendant’s Website, the TripleLift Tracker locates the cookie identifier stored
25 on the user’s browser. If the cookie is stored on the browser, the TripleLift Tracker causes the
26 browser to send the cookie along with the user’s IP address to TripleLift. A general diagram of this
27 process is pictured as Figure 2, which explains how the Website causes the TripleLift Tracker to

28 ¹⁵ *Technology*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/technology> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024).

1 install a cookie on the user's browser instructs the user's browser to send the user's IP address
2 through the cookie. See Figure 2, supra.

3 57. If the user clears his or her cookies, then the user wipes out the TripleLift Tracker
4 from its cache. Accordingly, the next time the user visits Defendant's Website the process begins
5 over again: (i) Defendant's server installs the TripleLift Tracker on the user's browser, (ii) the
6 TripleLift Tracker instructs the browser to send TripleLift the user's IP address, (iii) the TripleLift
7 Tracker stores a cookie in the browser cache, and (iv) TripleLift will continue to receive the user's
8 IP address on subsequent Website visits with the cookie transmission. See Figure 6 (showing IP
9 address being transmitted along with the cookie).

1 59. The TripleLift Tracker is at least a “process” because it is “software that identifies
2 consumers, gathers data, and correlates that data.” Greenley, supra, 2023 WL 4833466, at *15.

3 60. Further, the TripleLift Tracker is a “device” because “in order for software to work,
4 it must be run on some kind of computing device.” See, e.g., James v. Walt Disney Co., --- F. Supp.
5 3d ---, 2023 WL 7392285, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2023).

6 61. Because the TripleLift Tracker captures the outgoing information—the IP address—
7 from visitors to websites, it is a “pen register” for the purposes of CIPA section 638.50(b).

8
9 **B. Defendant Installed And Used The Trackers On Plaintiffs’ and**
10 **Users’ Website Visitors Browsers Without Prior Consent Or A**
11 **Court Order**

12 47-62. Defendant owns and operates the Website, Gamespot.com, which is a video gaming
13 website that provides news, reviews, previews, downloads, and other information on video games.

14 48-63. When companies build their websites, they install or integrate various third-party
15 scripts into the code of the website in order to collect data from users or perform other functions.¹⁶

16 49-64. Often times, third-party scripts are installed on websites “for advertising purposes.”¹⁷

17 50-65. Further, “[i]f the same third-party tracker is present on many sites, it can build a more
18 complete profile of the user over time.”¹⁸

19 51-66. ~~Since at least June 2023, if not earlier,~~ Defendant has long incorporated the code of
20 the Trackers into the code of its Website. ~~Thus, including~~ when Plaintiffs and other users visited
21 the Website. Thus, when Plaintiffs and other users visited the Website, the Website caused the
22 Trackers to be installed on Plaintiffs’ and other users’ browsers.

23 52-67. As outlined above, when a user visits the Website, the Website’s code—as
24 programmed by Defendant—installs the Trackers onto the user’s browser.

25 ¹⁶ See THIRD-PARTY TRACKING, <https://piwik.pro/glossary/third-party-tracking/> (“Third-party
26 tracking refers to the practice by which a tracker, other than the website directly visited by the user,
27 traces or assists in tracking the user’s visit to the site. Third-party trackers are snippets of code that
28 are present on multiple websites. They collect and send information about a user’s browsing history
to other companies...”).

¹⁷ *Id.*

¹⁸ *Id.*

1 53-68. Upon installing the Trackers on its Website, Defendant uses the Trackers to collect
 2 the IP address of visitors to the Website, including the IP address of Plaintiffs and Class Members.
 3 See Figures 4-3-6, (GumGum Tracker) and 5 (AudienceRate Tracker) supra.

4 **Figure 4:**

5 **Figure 5:**

6 54-69. ~~Defendant~~ The operators of the Trackers then uses the IP address of Website visitors,
 7 including those of Plaintiffs and Class Members, to serve targeted advertisements and conduct
 8 website analytics.

9 55-70. At no time prior to the installation and use of the Trackers on Plaintiffs' and Class
 10 Members's browsers, or prior to the use of the Trackers, did Defendant procure Plaintiffs' and Class
 11 Members's consent for such conduct. Nor did Defendant obtain a court order to install or use the
 12 Trackers.

13 **C. Defendant's Conduct Constitutes An Invasion Of Plaintiffs' and
 14 And Class Members' Privacy**

15 56-71. The collection of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' personally identifying, non-
 16 anonymized information through Defendant's installation and use of the Trackers constitutes an
 17 invasion of privacy.

18 57-72. As alleged herein, the Trackers are designed to analyze Website data and marketing
 19 campaigns, conduct targeted advertising, and boost Defendant's revenue, all through their
 20 surreptitious collection of Plaintiffs' and Class Members' data.

21 1. *Defendant ~~Discloses~~ Uses The GumGum Tracker ~~User's Data~~
 22 ~~To GumGum~~ For The Purposes ~~Of Marketing, Advertising,~~
 23 ~~And Analytics~~*

24 58-73. GumGum is a digital advertising platform that prides itself on its "ability to measure
 25 and optimize advertising campaigns to better understand a consumer's mindset that captures
 26 attention and drives action and outcomes."¹⁹

27 59-74. GumGum helps companies like Defendant market, advertise, and analyze user data
 28 from its website. One way GumGum assists with marketing and advertising is through its Ad

¹⁹ *About*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/about> (last visited Apr. 24, (last visited Jan. 3, 2024)).

1 Exchange, which is a direct marketplace where publishers and advertisers can buy and sell digital
 2 advertising space.²⁰ Thus, when a user enters a website, GumGum enables companies to
 3 instantaneously buy and sell ad space in a way that it optimized to the particular user.

4 ~~60-75.~~ According to GumGum, it uses artificial intelligence to scan the information on a web
 5 page to “deliver ads that are always relevant and align with what users are watching, reading and
 6 browsing online.”²¹ GumGum boasts that their “solution offers higher quality ads and increased
 7 scale across thousands of premium publisher sites” and “allow[s] advertisers to maximize their KPIs
 8 by targeting audience through customized segments such as multicultural and sustainability.”²²

9 ~~76.~~ Notably, GumGum claims that it uses “cookieless targeting” to drive significant brand
 10 KPIs, thereby not collecting personal identifiable information.²³ However, GumGum is setting a
 11 visitor cookie for the user session, which transmits a user’s IP address and other pieces of
 12 information. See Figure 7.

13 ~~61.— GumGum also offers companies ““Attention Metrics,”” which analyzes ““the amount~~
 14 ~~of time and focus an individual gives to a particular advertisement or piece of content.””²⁴—This~~
 15 ~~allows companies to ““[t]arget consumers where they are most attentive, ensuring maximum~~
 16 ~~performance and ad relevance for [its] brand.””²⁵—Thus, GumGum ““helps advertisers optimize ad~~
 17 ~~delivery to places where consumer attention is highest ... [and] presents a wealth of opportunities to~~
 18 ~~optimize campaign results [and] amplify brand lift.””²⁶~~

19 ~~62.— In order to perform the functions listed above, GumGum needs to collect data that~~
 20 ~~identifies a particular user. This is why GumGum collects IP addresses: it allows GumGum to~~

21 _____
 22 ²⁰ Exchange, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/exchange> (last visited Apr. 24, 2024~~last visited Jan. 3, 2024~~).

23 ²¹ *Contextual vs. Behavioral Targeting*, GUMGUM (Dec. 29, 2022), <https://gumgum.com/blog/contextual-vs-behavioral-targeting>.

24 ²² *GumGum AnnouenesAnnounces Industry’s First 100% Brand Safe Ad Exchange*, GUMGUM
 25 (March 15, 2023), <https://gumgum.com/press-releases/brand-safe-exchange>.

26 ²³ *Verity*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/verity> (last visited Apr. 24~~Jan. 3, 2024~~).

27 ²⁴ *Attention*, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/attention> (last visited Jan. 3, 2024).


28 ²⁵ *Id.*

²⁶ *Id.*

ascertain a user’s location and target that user with advertisements tailored to their location, as well as to track a user’s Website activity over time (i.e., through repeated Website visits) to target a user with advertisements relevant to the user’s personal browsing activity.

63. Notably, GumGum claims that it uses ““cookieless targeting”” to drive significant brand KPIs, thereby not collecting personal identifiable information.²⁷ However, GumGum is setting a visitor cookie for the user session, which transmits a user’s IP addresses and other pieces of information. See Figure 6.


Figure 67:



64.77. Indeed, GumGum is actually listed as a cookie when using browser developer tools to examine the Website. See Figure 78.

Figure 78:

²⁷ Verity, GUMGUM, <https://gumgum.com/verity> (last visited Jan. 3, 2024).



65-78. In other words, when users visit Defendant’s Website, GumGum collects users’ IP addresses through its GumGum Tracker ~~Defendant utilizes the GumGum Tracker to collecting IP addresses~~ so that Defendant can analyze user data, create and analyze the performance of marketing campaigns, and target specific users or specific groups of users for advertisements. All of this helps Defendant further monetize its Website and maximize revenue by allowing third parties to collect ing and disclosing user information.

2. Defendant Uses Discloses User’s Data To The Audiencerate Tracker For The Purposes Of Marketing, Advertising, And Analytics

66-79. Whereas GumGum specifically enables advertisements on websites, Audiencerate is a data platform that helps ~~““distribute anonymously personally identifiable information based and device based segment data””~~ for companies with audience-based marketing, advertising, and analysis ~~purposes.~~²⁸


67-80. Companies such as Defendant share their users’ data with Audiencerate through “daily synchronization” via the Audiencerate Tracker.²⁹ Audiencerate claims to anonymize the data

²⁸ Product Overview, AUDIENCERATE, https://app.audiencerate.com/doc/home (last visited Jan. 3, 2024).

²⁹ AUDIENCERATE, https://www.audiencerate.com/ (last visited Jan. 3, Apr. 24, 2024).

1 and organizes it into segments.³⁰ Then, companies use the segmented data to run targeted campaigns
2 and perform data analysis through Audiencerate's platform.³¹ See Figure 89.

3 **Figure 89:**



12 68-81. In addition to helping companies make better use of their own customer data,
13 Audiencerate helps companies *sell* their customers' data to further "monetize data."³²

14 69-82. In order to perform the functions listed above, Audiencerate needs to collect data that
15 identifies a particular user. This is why Audiencerate collects IP addresses: it allows Audiencerate
16 to segment users in order to run targeted campaigns and perform data analysis.

17 83. In other words, companies like Defendant are allowing Audiencerate to collect users'
18 data to increase Defendant's revenue, collecting users' data and sending it to Audiencerate for a
19 profit, whether it is by optimizing marketing campaigns or by purely selling the data.

20 3. Defendant Uses The TripleLift Tracker For The Purposes Of
21 Marketing, Advertising, And Analytics

22 84. TripleLift describes itself as a digital advertising platform that "work[s] for everyone:
23 publishers who seek greater monetization, advertisers who require better performance, [and]

24 _____
25 ³⁰ *Product Overview*, AUDIENCERATE, <https://app.audiencerate.com/doc/home> (last visited [Apr. 24](#)
[Jan. 3, 2024](#)).

26 ³¹ *Id.*

27 ³² *Audiencerate partnership sees Sirdata integrated on Adform marketplace for the first time*,
28 SIRDATA (Dec. 10, 2020), <https://news.sirdata.com/en/press-release-audiencerate-sirdata-partnership/>.

1 consumers who want better ad experiences.”³³

2 85. TripleLift helps companies like Defendant market, advertise, and analyze user data
3 from its website. For example, TripleLift enables publishers to place advertisements on their
4 webpages, in videos, or embedded in broadcasts. To ensure that an effective advertisement is shown
5 to the consumer, the publisher shares data about the user with TripleLift and TripleLift serves the
6 targeted ad.³⁴

7 86. TripleLift also helps advertisers select where to place their ads through “TripleLift
8 Audiences,” which “span[s] third-party and first-party data.”³⁵ In other words, TripleLift utilizes
9 third-party data, as well as data from the publisher where the ad is ultimately placed (i.e., first-party),
10 to determine where to place advertisers’ ads and who to place them in front of.

11 87. By way of example, if a home-goods brand wants to use TripleLift to serve its ads, it
12 can purchase TripleLift’s “Home Curated Deal” to reach “people who are investing their time and
13 money close to home.”³⁶ By choosing this set of data, the home-goods brand will be able to target
14 “audiences spending time on home improvement, home entertaining, outfitting their setups,
15 browsing real estate, raising kids and adopting pets.”³⁷ This data set can be used for ads in the
16 “Native, Display and Video” formats, “in placements known to deliver high viewability and high
17 video completion rates.”³⁸ TripleLift ensures that the data sets “are refreshed on an on-going basis
18 so that only the highest performing placements are included.”³⁹

19 88. In other words, when users visit Defendant’s Website, TripleLift collects users’ IP
20 addresses through its TripleLift Tracker so that Defendant can analyze user data, create and analyze

21 _____
22 ³³ *Who We Are*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/company> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

23 ³⁴ *See Smart Data & Targeting For Publishers*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/products/audiences-publishers> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

24 ³⁵ *Smart Data & Targeting For Advertisers*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/products/audiences-advertisers> (last visited April 2417, 2024).

25 ³⁶ *HOME*, TRIPLELIFT, <https://triplelift.com/exchange-traded-deals/home>
26 (last visited April 2417, 2024).

27 ³⁷ *Id.*

28 ³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ *Id.*

1 the performance of marketing campaigns, and target specific users or specific groups of users for
 2 advertisements. All of this helps Defendant further monetize its Website and maximize revenue by
 3 allowing third parties to collect user information.

4 70.

5 **III. PLAINTIFFS’S EXPERIENCE**


6 1. Plaintiff Shah

7 71-89. Plaintiff Shah has visited the Website multiple times—including as long ago as June
 8 2023 and as recently as January 2024—on his desktop browser.


9 72. When Plaintiff Shah visited the Website, the Website’s code—as programmed by
 10 Defendant—caused the GumGum and Audiencerate Trackers to be installed on Plaintiff Shah’s
 11 browser. Defendant, GumGum, and Audiencerate, then used the Trackers to collect Plaintiff Shah’s
 12 IP address. See Figures 9-10 (GumGum Tracker) and 110 (Audiencerate Tracker).

13 90.

14 **Figure 910:**



22 **Figure 101:**



1 91. Because Plaintiff Shah had previously visited the Website but not cleared his cookies
 2 at the time the data in Figure 8-10 was collected, Plaintiff Shah's IP address was sent to GumGum
 3 via the GumGum cookie, as opposed to being sent as standalone data as it would have been on
 4 Plaintiff Shah's first visit to the Website. However, as noted above, the IP address is transmitted
 5 within the cookie. *See Figures 7 and 38, supra.*

6 92. Defendant, GumGum, and Audiencerate used the information collected by the
 7 Trackers to analyze Website data and marketing campaigns, conducted targeted advertising based
 8 on Plaintiff Shah's location, and ultimately boost Defendant's and advertisers' revenue.

9 93. Plaintiff Shah did not provide his prior consent to Defendant to install or use the
 10 GumGum or Audiencerate Trackers on his browser.

11 94. Defendant did not obtain a court order before installing or using the GumGum or
 12 Audiencerate Trackers.

13 95. Plaintiff Shah has, therefore, had his privacy invaded by Defendant's violations of
 14 CIPA section 638.51(a).

15 2. Plaintiff Kim

16 96. Plaintiff Kim has visited the Website multiple times—including as long ago as July
 17 2023 and as recently as December 2023—on his desktop browser.

18 97. When Plaintiff Kim visited the Website, the Website's code—as programmed by
 19 Defendant—caused the TripleLift Tracker to be installed on Plaintiff Kim's browser. Defendant
 20 and TripleLift then used the Tracker to collect Plaintiff Kim's IP address. *See Figure 6, supra.*⁴⁰

21 73.—

22 74.98. Defendant ~~, GumGum, and Audiencerate~~ and TripleLift used the information
 23 collected by the TripleLift Trackers to analyze Website data and marketing campaigns, conduct
 24 targeted advertising, and ultimately boost Defendant's and advertisers' revenue.

25 75.99. Plaintiff Kim did not provide his-his prior consent to Defendant to install or use the
 26 TripleLift Trackers on Plaintiff Kim's browser.

27 ⁴⁰ At the time Plaintiff Kim retained counsel and did confirmatory testing, he was located in
 28 Indiana. However, during the time relevant to the Complaint, Plaintiff Kim was located in
California, as alleged above.

1 ~~80-108.~~ **Numerosity:** The number of people within the Class is substantial and
 2 believed to amount to thousands, if not millions of persons. It is, therefore, impractical to join each
 3 member of the Class as a named plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively modest value of the claims
 4 of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical. Accordingly, utilization of the
 5 class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of determining and adjudicating the
 6 merits of this litigation. Moreover, the Class is ascertainable and identifiable from Defendant’s
 7 records.

8 ~~81-109.~~ **Commonality and Predominance:** There are well-defined common
 9 questions of fact and law that exist as to all members of the Class and that predominate over any
 10 questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These common legal and factual
 11 questions, which do not vary between members of the Class, and which may be determined without
 12 reference to the individual circumstances of any Class Member, include, but are not limited to, the
 13 following:

- 14 (a) Whether Defendant violated CIPA ~~§section~~ 638.51(a);
- 15 (b) Whether the Trackers are “pen registers” pursuant to Cal. Penal Code
~~section§~~ 638.50(b);
- 16 (c) Whether Defendant sought or obtained prior consent—express or
 17 otherwise—from Plaintiff~~s~~ and the Class;
- 18 (d) Whether Defendant sought or obtained a court order for its use of the
 Trackers; and
- 19 (e) Whether Plaintiff~~s~~ and members of the Class are entitled to actual
 20 and/or statutory damages for the aforementioned violations.

21 ~~82-110.~~ **Typicality:** The claims of the named Plaintiff~~s~~ are typical of the claims of the
 22 Class because the named Plaintiff~~s~~, like all other members of the Class Members, visited the Website
 23 and had ~~his-their~~ IP address~~es~~ collected by the Trackers, which were installed and used by Defendant.

24 ~~83-111.~~ **Adequate Representation:** Plaintiff~~s~~ ~~is-are an~~ adequate representative~~s~~ of the
 25 Class because ~~his-their~~ interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class Members ~~he-they~~ seeks
 26 to represent, ~~he-they~~ ~~has-ve~~ retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and
 27 ~~he-they~~ intends to prosecute this action vigorously. The interests of members of the Class will be
 28 fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff~~s~~ and ~~his-their~~ counsel.

1 84.112. **Superiority:** The class mechanism is superior to other available means for the
 2 fair and efficient adjudication of the claims of members of the Class. Each individual member of the
 3 Class may lack the resources to undergo the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the
 4 complex and extensive litigation necessary to establish Defendant’s liability. Individualized
 5 litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and multiplies the burden on the judicial
 6 system presented by the complex legal and factual issues of this case. Individualized litigation also
 7 presents a potential for inconsistent or contradictory judgments. In contrast, the class action device
 8 presents far fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy
 9 of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court on the issue of Defendant’s liability. Class
 10 treatment of the liability issues will ensure that all claims and claimants are before this Court for
 11 consistent adjudication of the liability issues.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I

Violation Of The California Invasion Of Privacy Act, Cal. Penal Code § 638.51(a)

14 85.113. Plaintiff~~s~~ repeats the allegations contained in the foregoing paragraphs as if
 15 fully set forth herein.

16 86.114. Plaintiff~~s~~ brings this claim individually and on behalf of the members of the
 17 proposed Class against Defendant.

18 87.115. CIPA §-section 638.51(a) proscribes any “person” from “install[ing] or us[ing]
 19 a pen register or a trap and trace device without first obtaining a court order.”

20 88.116. A “pen register” is a “a device or process that records or decodes dialing,
 21 routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a
 22 wire or electronic communication is transmitted, but not the contents of a communication.” Cal.
 23 Penal Code § 638.50(b).

24 89.117. The Trackers are “pen registers” because they are “device[s] or process[es]”
 25 that “capture[d]” the “routing, addressing, or signaling information”—the IP address—from the
 26 electronic communications transmitted by Plaintiff~~s~~’s and the Class’s computers or smartphones.
 27 Cal. Penal Code § 638.50(b).
 28

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff~~s~~ demands a trial by jury of any and all issues in this action so triable of right.

Dated: April 29, 2024

Respectfully submitted,

BURSOR & FISHER, P.A.

By: /s/ L. Timothy Fisher
~~Emily L. Timothy Fisher~~ ~~A. Horne~~

L. Timothy Fisher (State Bar No. 191626)
Emily A. Horne (State Bar No. 347723)
1990 North California Blvd., Suite 940
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone: (925) 300-4455
Facsimile: (925) 407-2700
E-mail: ltfisher@bursor.com
ehorne@bursor.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff~~s~~